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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS-THE LAW CONTROLLING THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIED
VOMAN'S CONTRACT.-The case of Poole v. Perkins (Va.), IO S. E. 240,
involves that troublesome question of whether the validity of a contract is
to be ruled by the law of the place where made, or by that of the place of
performance.
Mrs. Poole joined with her husband in the execution and delivery ih Ten-
nessee, where they were domiciled, of a promissory note to the order of
Perkins, also domiciled in Tennessee, the note being payable in Virginia.
By the law of Tennessee the contracts of married women could not be
enforced against her. By the law of Virginia she was bound by them.
It is a little dificult to determine whether the court, in concluding that
the law of the place of performance should control, does so intending to an-
nounce the broad rule that what is the applicable law is 1o be determined
by discovering what was the intention of the parties as to the law to be ap-
plied, or whether it does so intending to announce that the general rule is,
that the validity of a contract is to be determined by applying the law of the
place fixed for performance.
There is abundance of authority from courts having the highest regard
of the profession, on both sides of these questions. The aim therefore will
be, not so much to attempt a discussion of the cases pro and con, as to briefly
present the question in the light of general principles.
It may well be said that the ultimate aim in the administration of civil
justice, is to effectuate the intention of parties interested. So one essaying
the solution of the question of what law should be applied in determining
the validity of a contract, regard should doubtless be had for this principle.
I In the case under discussion there is no evidence of what was the inten-
tion of the parties, aside from the facts that their contract was actually cre-
ated, so far as it may be said to have been created at all, in Tennessee, and
that it provided for payment in Virginia. Apparently, -except for the fact
that the state line between the two states ran through it, Bristol in Tennes-
see and Bristol in Virginia were one town. The note was made and deliv-
ered in the Tennessee part of the town while payment was provided for at
the bank which happened to be in the Virginia part of the town; this being
done as a mere matter of convenience, with no particular thought of what
was the law of either state upon the capacity of a married woman to contract.
The question presented therefore, upon this theory of determining the
applicable law, is one of whether the fact that the law of the place of per-
formance, if applied, will establish validity, while the law of the place of
making, if applied, will defeat all obligation, is in itself sufficent to require
the conclusion, really as a matter of law, that the parties intended the appli-
cation of the law which would give validity. Apart from the matter of judi-
cial authority, to conclude that the parties intended validity rather than in-
validity is not to draw a long bow. But it is not to be overlooked that it is
one thing to say that, and quite ariother to say, that the note was made pay-
able in Virginia because they appreciated that the law of that state upheld
such contracts while the law of the state of Tennessee did not. In the opin-
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ion of the writer it is doubtful whether any case can be found declaring the
law to be, that the fact alone, that the law of one jurisdiction will enforce
the contract while the law of the other will refuse enforcement, is 
sufficient
to require the conclusion that the parties intended that the law of one 
rather
than the other, should rule their act. Numberless cases justify the admissi-
bility of this fact as evidentiary, but none so far as the writer has 
discov-
ered, holds that it will outweigh the natural presumption that one expects
his acts and conduct to be judged by the law of the place where he acts.
The three cases in 9st, 93rd and 95th of Virginia reports, referred 
to in
the opinion on this question, all involve the principle as applied 
in usury
cases where a definite rule has grown up permitting the parties 
to contract
for the rate obtaining in either jurisdiction.
Professor Beale points out, 23 HARV. LAW REv. 260, that to allow 
indi-
viduals to choose the law by which they will be bound is opposed 
to our
system of jurisprudence. Law is an imposition by the state, using its legis-
lative arm upon all persons within its jurisdiction, and such persons cannot
choose not to be bound by it. They cannot will that they shall not 
be sub-
ject to its operation, nor that their conduct shall not be controlled by it. It
is no answer to this argument to say that they do so choose 
when they go
from one jurisdiction to another to consummate their act iri order to secure
the application of the law of that jurisdiction. In this sense every person doing
any voluntary act may be said to choose the law determining 
the conse-
quences bf his act, because he might do it somewhere else. It is 
one thing
to say that one may secure the application to his act of the law of 
a particu-
lar jurisdiction by going there and doing the act, and quite another to say
that he may act in one jurisdiction, and by willing that the law of another
shall control the consequences of his act, escape the consequences 
of the ap-
plication of the local law.
"This intention," says Mr. Dicey in referring to the intention 
which some-
times influences the determination of the proper law, "is 
a quite different
thing from the intention which, in the absence of fraud, or the 
like, must
always exist that a contract may be valid; it is a different thing 
also from
the intention that a contract made in fact under the law of one country, shall,
as to its validity, be governed by the law of some other country. 
This is
clearly a result that cannot be affected by the will of the partied." 
DicFY ON
CONFLICr OF LAWS, 555.
Mr. Wharton, in speaking to exactly the same question 
as that involved
in the case under discussion says, "The capacity of parties 
to contract is one
of those matters which relates to the question of whether, 
in a legal sense,
any contract has been brought into existence, 'and its governing 
law should
be determined by a fixed rule, not dependent upon the will 
of the parties;
and as a matter of fact, while the courts have not always 
agreed upon the
rule, they have seldom referred the ultimate question of 
the governing law
in this respect, to the intention of the parties." WHARTON 
ON CONFLICT O1:
LAWS, 904.
Mr. Minor, in his "CoNFLICT or LAWS," uses this language, "The 
design
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or purposc of the parties to enter into a valid contract, .tanding alone, can
never siffice to validate a contract prolioitcd by the law, nor to invalidate a
contract not legally prohibited. * * * The question therefore, where the valid-
ity of the contract is under investigation, is not what law do the parties in-
tend shall govern a particular element, but wh.'.t law shall actually govern it."
MINOR, CONFLICT oF LAWS, p. 401. Mr. Minor then proceeds to show that
a contract may fail because the things done, where done, do -not create a
contract, or because to perform tle contract in .he place provided for per-
fo.'mance is not permitted by the lhw of that place, or because the "considera-
tion for the contract involves the doing of something in a jurisdiction
where, to do the thing is prohibited. In other words the question may
relate to the matter of creation of the contract, or to its performance, or to
its conslderation, and the controllirng law is to be determined by determina-
tion of the situs of that element of the contract involved.
It is an easy conclusion that the matter of "capacity" of a party to make
a particular contract relates itself, not to the performance, nor to the consid-
eration, but to the creation of the contract. Without capacity the party can-.
not create.
The fact that the act in performance of the contract is ruled by the law
of the place of the act in performance, and the act which furnishes the con-
sideration for the contract, is ruled by the law of the place of that act, is
but a supporting argument for the contention that the act of making shall be
ruled by the law of the place of the act of creation.
The court in its op;nion in the case being discussed, gives countenance
to the doctrine that "where the contract is made in one place and is to be
performed in another, not only may the law of the latter be properly called
the (law of) the locus contractus, but that it ought in all respects, except
as to the formalities and solemnities and modes of execution, to be deemed
the rule to govern such cases." The serious objection to such a conclusion.
involving as it does the proposition that if the place where the contract is
actually executed differs from the place of performance, then the place of
making is the place of performance, is its wide departure from fact. It sug-
gests the homely adage that "one can't make a calf's tail a leg by "calling it
one". No emphasis can be put on words used, sufficient, or so placed, as to
make Virginia the place of making of the contract, when every act having
to do with its coming into existence is done in Tennessee, all the parties at
the time were there and there domiciled. The universally recognized rule
in the law of contracts is that the contract is made in that place where the
last step is taken to make it a binding obligation, the contract in question
was fully created in so far as it had any existence, long before there was
anything having reference to it done, or to be done, in Virginia, and no
step, at any time was taken in Virginia having anything to do with its crea-
tion. If the contract was ever born, no more misleading statement could be
made than to say that its birth-place was Virginia.
But it is said, that apart from the contention that intent of parties con-
trols, and apart from the theory that the place of -making is the place of per-
HeinOnline  -- 18 Mich. L. Rev. 414 1919-1920
NOTE AND COMMENT
formance regardless of the place where the contract actually comes
into being, there is still a hard and fast rule that where the place of making
is different from the place of performance, the contract is ruled, as to its
validity, by the law of the place of performance, and authorities sufficient in
numbers to satisfy of the existence of almost any other rule of law can be
found in support of the proposition. Certainly as respectable showing of
authority can be found in opposition. Whence this confusion? It seems
best accounted for by recognizing that there has been a failure to analyze
the contract and note that its different elements, the making, the perform-
ance and the consideration, may each have its own situs differing from each
of the others, and therefore each have its own law controlling it. Some court
has iightly enough decided some time that a contract was void because the
law of the place of its performance made it void, and some other court has
adopted the decision as establishing the doctrine that the validity of a con-
tract is ruled by the law of the place fixed for its performance. If the first
case involved the question of the lawfulness of doing the act required for
performance it might well conclude that the place where the act is to be done
,should furnish the answering rule. Whereas it would be absurd to contend
that such a decision should furnish the rule for a case where the question
of validity had no felation to the place or matter of performance.
Excellent discussions of the questions involved in the case examined,
may be -found in 'the following authorities; many of which are referred to
in the opinion of the court:
Campbell v. Crampton, 2 Fed. 414; Union National Bank v. Chapman, 169
N. Y. 538, 57 L. R. A. 513, 88 Am. St. Rep. 614; Burr v. Beckler,'264 Ill. 230,
L. R. A. i9i6A, io49. The reports of Bank v. Chapman and Burr v. Beckler
in L. R. A. are accompanied with excellent notes. To these should be added
the case of Mayer v. Robhe, 77 N. J. Law, 681, 26 L. IR A. (N. S.) 763, and
-note, and the text citations given supra. V. H. L.
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